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Abstract
We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) [Shapley, L., Scarf’s, H., 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal
of Mathematical Economics 1, 23–37.] model of trading indivisible objects (houses) to so-called multiple-type housing markets.
We show that the prominent solution for these markets, the coordinate-wise core rule, is second-best incentive compatible.
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1. Introduction
We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) model of trading indivisible objects (houses) to so-
called multiple-type housing markets. In Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing markets each agent is endowed with
an indivisible commodity: a house. Furthermore, each agent wishes to consume exactly one house and strictly ranks
all houses in the market. Interestingly, one of the best-known solution concepts for barter economies can always be
applied: the core for any housing market is non-empty (Scarf and Shapley, 1974). In addition, the core is always a
singletonanditcoincideswiththeuniquecompetitiveallocation(RothandPostlewaite,1977).Furthermore,thetrading
rule that assigns the unique core allocation for any housing market is strategy-proof, i.e., no agent can beneﬁt from
misrepresenting his preferences (Roth, 1982). In addition, (Ma, 1994) demonstrated that the core rule is the unique
trading rule satisfying Pareto efﬁciency, strategy- proofness, and individual rationality.
We consider an extension of Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing markets – multiple-type housing markets – with
severaltypesofindivisiblecommodities,maybehousesandcars:eachagentisendowedwithanindivisiblecommodity
of each type and wishes to consume exactly one commodity of each type.1Moulin (1995) introduced multiple-type
housing markets, but Konishi et al. (2001) were the ﬁrst to analyze the model. They demonstrate that when increasing
the dimension of the model by adding other types of indivisible commodities, most of the positive results obtained for




1 A more realistic example of course assignments to students is described in Klaus (2006).
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the one-dimensional case disappear: even for additively separable2 preferences the core may be empty and no Pareto
efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and individually rational trading rule exists. For separable preferences, Konishi et al. (2001)
and Wako (2005) suggested an alternative solution to the core by ﬁrst using separability to decompose a multiple-type
housing market into “coordinate-wise submarkets” and second, determining the core in each submarket. Wako (2005)
calls the resulting outcome the commodity-wise competitive allocation and shows that it is implementable in coalition-
proof Nash equilibria. We call the rule that assigns the commodity-wise (unique) core allocation in each submarket the
“coordinate-wise core rule.” From its deﬁnition it follows easily that the coordinate-wise core rule satisﬁes strategy-
proofnessandindividualrationality,butnotParetoefﬁciency.Miyagawa(2002)characterizesthecoordinate-wisecore
rule by citizen sovereignty,3strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and non-bossiness 4. Hence, in the absence of
Pareto efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and individual rational trading rules, the coordinate-wise core rule seems to be a good
compromise.
In this article, we further promote the coordinate-wise core rule as a desirable solution for multiple-type housing
markets. We do so by showing that the coordinate-wise core is second-best incentive compatible (Theorem 1). In other
words, there exists no other strategy-proof trading rule that Pareto dominates the coordinate-wise core rule. Given that
for multiple-type housing markets Pareto efﬁciency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality are not compatible,
we show that applying the coordinate-wise core rule is a minimal concession with respect to Pareto efﬁciency while
preserving strategy-proofness and individual rationality.
2. Multiple-type housing markets and the coordinate-wise core
We mostly follow Miyagawa’s (2002) model and notation of housing markets with multiple types. Let N =
{1,...,n}, n ≥ 2, be the set of agents. There exist ¯   ≥ 1 types of (distinct) indivisible objects. The set of object
types is denoted by L ={ 1,...,¯  } and each agent i∈N is endowed with one object of each type  ∈L, denoted by i.
Thus, N also denotes the set of objects of each type.
An allocation is a reallocation of objects among agents such that each agent again receives one object of each type.
Formally, an allocation is a list x = (xi( ))i∈N, ∈L ∈NN×L such that
(i) each agent receives one object of each type, i.e., for all i∈N and all  ∈L, xi( )∈N denotes the object of type  
that agent i consumes, e.g.,i fxi( ) = j, then agent i receives agent j’s endowment of type  , and
(ii) no object of any type is assigned to more than one agent at allocation x. Thus, for all  ∈L, ∪i∈N{xi( )}=N.
Let X denote the set of allocations.G i v e nx∈X and  ∈L, x( ) = (x1( ),...,x n( )) denotes the allocation of type-
  objects. Given x∈X and i∈N, xi = (xi(1),...,x i(¯  )) denotes the list of objects that agent i receives at allocation
x. We call xi agent i’s (consumption) bundle. Note that the set of bundles for each agent i∈N can be denoted by NL.
We denote each agent i’s endowment by (i ,...,i)∈NL.
Each agent i∈N has complete, transitive, and strict preferences Ri over bundles, i.e., Ri is a linear order over NL.
Thus, for bundles xi,y i ∈NL, xiPiyi implies xi  = yi and xiIiyi implies xi = yi. In addition to being linear orders, we
assume that preferences are separable: each agent i∈N has complete, transitive, and strict marginal preferences Ri( )
over the objects of each type   and prefers consuming a bundle xi to a bundle yi if xi  = yi and all objects received at xi
are (weakly) better than those received at yi according to the marginal preferences, i.e., for all  ∈L, xi( )Ri( )yi( ).
Formally, a preference relation Ri over NL is separable if for all  ∈L, there exists a linear order Ri( ) deﬁned over
N, Pi( ) being its strict part, such that for any two bundles xi,y i ∈NL, if for all  ∈L, xi( )Ri( )yi( ), and for some
˜  , xi(˜  )Pi(˜  )yi(˜  ), then xiPiyi.B yR we denote the set of separable linear orders over NL. Since for all agents i∈N,
R represents agent i’s set of preferences, by RN =× i∈NR we denote the set of (preference) proﬁles. Since the set of
agents and their endowments remain ﬁxed throughout, RN also denotes the set of multiple-type housing markets.F o r
¯   = 1 our multiple-type housing market model equals the classical Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing market model.
2 By separability, preferences between commodities of the same type do not depend on the consumption of commodities of different types. We
formally introduce separable preferences in Section 2.
3 No allocation is excluded from the range of the trading rule.
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A (trading) rule is a function ϕ : RN → X that assigns to each multiple-type housing market R∈RN an allocation
ϕ(R)∈X.B yϕi(R) we denote the bundle assigned by ϕ to agent i∈N.
Beforeweintroduceourmainrule,thecoordinate-wisecorerule,weneedsomenotation.Thesetofallreallocations
of objects among the members of coalition S ⊆ N is denoted by
XS ={ (xi( ))i∈S, ∈L ∈NS×L : for all ∈L, ∪i∈S{xi( )}=S}.
Similarly, for  ∈L the set of all reallocations of type-   objects among the members of coalition S ⊆ N is denoted by
XS( ) ={ (xi( ))i∈S ∈NS : ∪i∈S{xi( )}=S}.
Given x∈X and  ∈L,atrading cycle for x( ) is a coalition T ⊆ N such that
(i) agents in T obtain their objects of type   by reallocating their endowments of type   among themselves, i.e.,
(xi( ))i∈T ∈XT( ) and
(ii) coalition T is minimal, i.e., there exists no T   T such that (xi( ))i∈T  ∈XT ( ).
Note that for all x∈X and  ∈L, there exists a partition {T1,...,T m} of N such that for each k∈{1,...,m}, Tk is
a trading cycle for x( ).
An allocation is in the core if no coalition of agents can improve their welfare by reallocating their endowments
among themselves. Formally, an allocation x∈X is a (strict or strong) core allocation for the multiple-type housing
market R∈RN if there exist no coalition S ⊆ N and no y∈XS such that for all i∈S, yiRixi, and for some j ∈S,
yjPjxj.
For any housing market, the unique core allocation can easily be calculated by using the so-called top-trading
algorithm (due to David Gale, see Shapley and Scarf (1974)). The coordinate-wise core rule ϕcc assigns to each
multiple-type housing market R∈RN the unique coordinate-wise core allocation ϕcc(R) ≡ x∈X that is obtained by
separately calculating the core allocation x( ) for each object type  ∈L in its associated marginal object type market,
e.g.,byapplyingthetoptradingalgorithm.Formally,forall ∈L,thereexistsnocoalitionS ⊆ N andnoy( )∈XS( ),
such that for all i∈S, yi( )Ri( )xi( ), and for some j ∈S, yj( )Pj( )xj( ). For ¯   = 1 we call ϕcc the core rule. A
description of the well-known top trading algorithm and an illustrating example for the coordinate-wise core rule can
be found in the working paper version of this note (Klaus, 2006).
3. Pareto efﬁciency, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and second-best incentive compatibility
We now introduce and discuss some well-known properties for rules. First we consider an efﬁciency requirement.
Pareto efﬁciency. For all R∈RN there exists no y∈X such that for all i∈N, yiRiϕi(R), and for some j ∈N,
yjPjϕj(R).
Second, we formulate a voluntary participation condition: no agent receives a bundle that he considers worse than
his endowment.
Individual rationality. For all R∈RN and all i∈N, ϕi(R)Ri(i ,...,i)
Next, we discuss an incentive property: no agent ever beneﬁts from misrepresenting his preference relation. In
game theoretical terms, a rule is strategy-proof if in its associated direct revelation game form, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for each agent to announce his true preference relation. Given i∈N, R∈RN, and R 
i ∈R, we denote by
(R 
i,R −i)∈RN the new proﬁle that is obtained from R by replacing Ri with R 
i.
Strategy-proofness. For all R∈RN, all i∈N, and all R 
i ∈R, ϕi(R)Riϕi(R 
i,R −i).
Ma (1994) proved that for housing markets the core rule ϕcc is the unique rule satisfying Pareto efﬁciency, individ-
ual rationality, and strategy-proofness. For multiple-type housing markets generally no Pareto efﬁcient, individually
rational, and strategy-proof rule exists (Konishi et al., 2001). Given this impossibility, Miyagawa (2002) demonstrated922 B. Klaus / Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008) 919–924
that by weakening Pareto efﬁciency and by strengthening strategy-proofness a characterization of the coordinate-wise
corerulecanbeobtained:thecoordinate-wisecoreruleϕcc istheuniquerulesatisfyingcitizensovereignty5,Individual
rationality, and strong strategy-proofness6 (see Miyagawa, 2002b Theorem 1). Wako (2005) considered a normal form
game and showed that its unique coalition-proof equilibrium outcome equals the coordinate-wise core. Note that since
in the top trading algorithm neither the names of the objects nor the names of the agents play any particular role, the
coordinate-wise core also satisﬁes neutrality and anonymity. Thus, even though the coordinate-wise core rule ϕcc is
not Pareto efﬁcient, it has many appealing properties. We prove another appealing property of the coordinate-wise core
rule ϕcc: no other strategy-proof rule Pareto dominates ϕcc.
Pareto domination of rules. Rule ψ Pareto dominates rule ϕ if for all R∈RN and all i∈N, ψi(R)Riϕi(R) and for
some R  ∈RN and j ∈N, ψj(R )P 
jϕj(R ).
Second-best incentive compatibility. If rule ϕ is strategy-proof and no strategy-proof rule ψ Pareto dominates rule
ϕ, then ϕ is second-best incentive compatible.
Theorem 1. The coordinate-wise core rule ϕcc is second-best incentive compatible.
We use the following lemma in the proof of Theorem 1. Basically it states that if at some proﬁle an allocation
y Pareto dominates the coordinate-wise core allocation x, then some agent who prefers y to x must receive in some
marginal object type market an object at y that, according to marginal preferences, is worse than the one received at x.
Lemma 1. Let R∈RN and x ≡ ϕcc(R). Let y∈X such that for all i∈N, yiRixi, and for some j ∈N, yjPjxj. Then,
there exists k∈N such that ykPkxk and for some  ∈L, xk( )Pk( )yk( ).
ProofofLemma1. LetR∈RN andx ≡ ϕcc(R).Lety∈Xsuchthatforalli∈N,yiRixi,andforsomej ∈N,yjPjxj.
Since preferences are strict,
for alli∈N, eitheryiPixI orxi = yi. (1)
Suppose, by contradiction, that no k∈N exists such that ykPkxk and for some  ∈L, xk( )Pk( )yk( ). Hence, by (1),
separability of preferences, and strictness of marginal preferences,
for alli∈N and all ∈L, eitheryi( )Pi( )xi( )orxi( ) = yi( ). (2)
Since there exists j ∈N such that yjPjxj,b y(2) there exists a marginal object type market, e.g., ˜  ∈L, such that
yj(˜  )Pj(˜  )xj(˜  )and for alli∈N, yi(˜  )Ri(˜  )xi(˜  ). (3)
Thus, by (3) there exists a coalition of agents that can reallocate their endowments of type ˜   among themselves such
that according to their marginal preferences for objects of type ˜  , they are all weakly better off and at least one member
of the coalition is strictly better off. Formally, there exists a coalition S ⊆ N such that z(˜  ) ≡ (yi(˜  ))i∈S ∈XS(˜  ) and
for alli∈S, zi(˜  )Ri(˜  )xi(˜  )and for somek∈S, zk(˜  )Pk(˜  )xk(˜  ). (4)
Since x ≡ ϕcc(R), (4) yields the required contradiction to the deﬁnition of the (coordinate-wise) core for the marginal
object type market ˜  . 
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a strategy-proof rule ψ that Pareto dominates ϕcc.
Recall that ϕcc is individually rational. Thus, since ψ Pareto dominates ϕcc,i ti sindividually rational as well.
5 A rule ϕ satisﬁes citizen sovereignty if no allocation is excluded from the range of the trading rule, i.e., for all x∈X there exists R∈RN such
that ϕ (R)=x.
6 A rule ϕ satisﬁes strong strategy-proofness if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy, i.e., for all R∈RN, i∈N, and R 
i ∈R, there exists no S⊆N
with i∈S such that for all j∈S, ϕj(R 
i,R −i)Rjϕj(R)and for some k∈S, ϕk(R 
i,R −i)Pkϕk(R).B. Klaus / Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008) 919–924 923
In the following induction proof we transform agents’ preferences such that agents prefer fewer and fewer object
types to their respective object type endowments. For R∈RN and i∈N, B(Ri) ≡

 ∈L|{j ∈N : jPi( )i}| equals the
total number of object types that agent i prefers to his respective object type endowments. We denote the total number
of object types that agents prefer to their respective object type endowments by B(R) ≡

i∈NB(Ri).
Induction Basis (Induction Step 0). Since ψ Pareto dominates ϕcc, for all R∈RN and all i∈N, ψi(R)Riϕcc
i (R) and
for some R0 ∈RN and j ∈N, ψj(R0)P0
jϕcc
j (R0). To simplify notation let x0 ≡ ϕcc(R0) and y0 ≡ ψ(R0). By Lemma 1,
there exists j(0)∈N such that y0
j(0)P0
j(0)x0
j(0) and for some  (0)∈L, x0
j(0)( (0))P0
j(0)( (0))y0
j(0)( (0)). We now change
agent j(0)’s preferences R0
j(0) to preferences R1
j(0) ∈R such that:
(i) According to j(0)’s new marginal preferences R1
j(0)( ) for any object type  ∈L, y0
j(0)( ) is the best object of type  
and if it is different from agent j(0)’s endowment of type  , then (the endowment of type  ) j(0) is the second-best
object of type  , i.e., for all  ∈L, y0
j(0)( )R1
j(0)( )j(0) and for all i∈N \{ y0
j(0)( ),j(0)}, j(0)P1
j(0)( )i.
(ii) Anycommoditybundlezj(0) ∈NL thatassignsanobjectoftype ∈Lthatdoesnotequaly0
j(0)( )ortheendowment






−j(0))∈RN.Tosimplifynotationletx1 ≡ ϕcc(R1)andy1 ≡ ψ(R1).NotethatatR1
j(0) agentj(0)’s
best bundle equals y0
j(0). Thus, by strategy-proofness of ψ, y1
j(0) = y0
j(0).B ystrategy-proofness of ϕcc, x1
j(0)  = y0
j(0).
Hence, x1
j(0)  = y1
j(0). Then, since ψ Pareto dominates ϕcc, y1
j(0)P1
j(0)x1
j(0) and for all i∈N, y1
i Rix1
i. Thus, by Lemma 1,
there exists j(1)∈N such that y1
j(1)P1
j(1)x1




Claim 1. j(1)∈N \{ j(0)}
Proof of Claim 1. If j(1) = j(0), then x1
j(0)( (1))P1
j(0)( (1))y1




1( (1))] is the best object of type  (1). Hence, j(1)  = j(0). 
Deﬁne N(1) ≡| N \{ j(0)}|. Note that N(1) < |N|.
Induction Step k. let k ≥ 1 and j(k)∈N such that yk
j(k)Pk
j(k)xk




j(k)( (k)). We now change agent j(k)’s preferences Rk






and if it is different from agent j(k)’s endowment of type  , then (the endowment of type  ) j(k) is the second-best
object of type  , i.e., for all  ∈L, yk
j(k)( )Rk+1
j(k)( )j(k) and for all i∈N \{ yk
j(k)( ),j(k)}, j(k)Pk+1
j(k) ( )i.
(ii) Anycommoditybundlezj(k) ∈NL thatassignsanobjectoftype ∈Lthatdoesnotequalyk
j(k)( )ortheendowment






−j(k))∈RN.Tosimplifynotationletxk+1 ≡ ϕcc(Rk+1)andyk+1 ≡ ψ(Rk+1).NotethatatRk
j(k)
agent j(k)’s best bundle equals yk
j(k). Similarly as before it follows that yk+1
j(k) = yk
j(k), xk+1





By Lemma 1, there exists j(k + 1)∈N such that yk+1
j(k+1)Pk+1
j(k+1)xk+1
j(k+1) and for some  (k + 1)∈L, xk+1
j(k+1)( (k +
1))Pk+1
j(k+1)( (k + 1))yk+1
j(k+1)( (k + 1)).
Claim k+1. j(k + 1)∈N \{ j(0),...,j(k)} or B(Rk
j(k+1)) >B (Rk+1
j(k+1))924 B. Klaus / Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008) 919–924
Proof of Claim k+1. Suppose that j(k + 1)∈{j(0),...,j(k)}, i.e., for some k ≥ k  ≥ 0, j(k + 1) = j(k ).
Hence, Rk
j(k+1) resulted from a previous transformation. Without loss of generality, at the end of Step k  − 1,
Rk
j(k+1) = Rk 
j(k+1). Thus, B(Rk









j(k+1)( )  = j(k + 1)}. Since for some  (k + 1)∈L, xk+1
j(k+1)( (k + 1))Pk+1
j(k+1)( (k +
1))yk+1
j(k+1)( (k + 1)), B(Rk
j(k+1)) >B (Rk+1
j(k+1)). 
Deﬁne N(k + 1) ≡| N \{ j(0),...,j(k)}|.
Note that at the end of each Induction Step k, N(k) >N (k + 1) or B(Rk) >B (Rk+1). Hence, after ﬁnitely many
induction steps ˆ k, N(ˆ k + 1) = 0o rB(R
ˆ k+1) = 0. If N(ˆ k + 1) = 0, then in a contradiction toLemma 1 no further agent
j(ˆ k + 1)∈N \{ 1,...,j(ˆ k)} exists at the end of Step ˆ k. Hence, B(R
ˆ k+1) = 0. Then, by individual rationality, for all
i∈N, x
ˆ k+1 = y
ˆ k+1
i = (i ,...,i). However, at the end of Step ˆ k, there exists j(ˆ k + 1)∈N such that x
ˆ k+1




One can easily show that the coordinate-wise core is not the only second-best incentive compatible rule.
Considerthefollowingslightvariationofthecoordinate-wisecore.Forsimplicityassumethat ¯   = 1.Fixtwoagents,
without loss of generality, agents 1 and 2, with the speciﬁcation that agent 2 can never receive agent 1’s endowment
whenapplyingthetoptradingalgorithm.Then,foranyproﬁleR∈RN wecalculateϕ1,2(R)byapplyingthetoptrading
algorithm with the extra speciﬁcation that agent 2 is not allowed to point to agent 1 (for a formal deﬁnition see Klaus
(2006)). Loosely speaking, the second-best incentive compatibility of ϕcc and the fact that for many R∈RN such
that ϕ1,2(R)  = ϕcc(R), agent 2’s trade restriction beneﬁts some other agent(s), imply that ϕ1,2 is second-best incentive
compatible. Note that ϕ1,2 can easily be (coordinate-wise) extended to ¯  >1. Clearly, ϕ1,2 is individually rational,b u t
neither Pareto efﬁcient nor anonymous.
Another class of rules that are second-best incentive compatible because they are all Pareto efﬁcient and strategy-
proof (but not individually rational) are serial dictatorship rules: the ﬁrst agent in a ﬁxed order chooses his favorite
bundle, then the second agent chooses his favorite bundle among the remaining feasible bundles, etc. In fact, also
dictatorial rules where the choice of the next chooser may depend on previous choices, object type combinations
previously chosen, identity of previous choosers, etc., are Pareto efﬁcient and strategy-proof and therefore second-best
incentive compatible.
Itisanopenproblemif,apartfromthecoordinate-wisecorerulethereareotherindividuallyrational,strategy-proof,
anonymous, neutral, and second-best incentive compatible rules: the so-called top-trading rule where agents are only
allowed to trade their (complete) endowments is individually rational, strategy-proof, anonymous, and neutral.W e
conclude with a conjecture that we could not yet verify.
Conjecture: The top-trading rule is second-best incentive compatible.
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